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A ROLE MODEL FOR CHINA? EXCHANGE RATE 





Few papers have tried to project how Chinese monetary policy will behave under flexible 
exchange rates. As Japan provides an important role model for China, this paper studies the 
role of the yen/dollar exchange rate for Japanese monetary policy after the shift of Japan from 
a fixed to a floating exchange rate regime. The econometric estimations allow for regime 
shifts in the impact of the exchange rate on monetary policy. The results show that the 
exchange rate had a substantial impact on Japanese monetary policy in periods of 
appreciation. This implies rising uncertainty and that repeated attempts to soften the 
appreciation pressure by interest rate cuts have led Japan into the liquidity trap.  
JEL Code: E43, E52, E58, F31, F41. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 
An increasing number of papers are discussing the pros and cons of more exchange rate flexibility 
of the Chinese yuan (Goldstein 2003, Cheung, Chinn and Fujii 2005, Cline 2005, Frankel 2006, 
McKinnon and Schnabl 2006, Goodfriend and Prasad 2007 among others). Proponents of a flexible 
yuan have stressed the need for macroeconomic flexibility in the economic catch-up process of the 
Chinese economy (Goldstein 2003, Frankel 2006). Given buoyant capital inflows it has been argued 
that a substantial appreciation of the Chinese yuan would help to prevent a possible overheating of 
the Chinese economy and to correct the trade imbalance between China and the US (Goldstein 
2003).  
 
In contrast, proponents of the Chinese dollar peg have argued that the stability of the Chinese yuan 
against the dollar had a stabilizing impact not only for China itself but for East Asia as a whole 
(McKinnon 2004). The reason is that growth tends to be led by exports and China’s fast rising 
international assets are denominated in foreign currency (McKinnon and Schnabl 2004). 
Furthermore, McKinnon and Schnabl (2006) have argued that for countries in the economic catch-
up process fixed exchange rates provide a more stable framework for the adjustment of labour and 
asset markets. They argue that Japan’s repeated attempts to soften (productivity driven) 
appreciation pressure by interest rate cuts have led Japan into the liquidity trap.  
 
Up to the present, comparatively few papers have focused on the question of how Chinese monetary 
policy is likely to behave under a flexible exchange rate regime. Japan provides an important case 
study for the prospects of the Chinese monetary policy under a freely floating exchange rate for at 
least four reasons. First, like in China today, growth in Japan has been traditionally led by exports 
(McKinnon and Ohno 1997). Second, like Japan China is an important saving surplus country and 
has accumulated large stocks of dollar denominated international assets (McKinnon and Schnabl 
2004). Third, Japan has shifted from a fixed to a flexible exchange rate regime in the early 1970s 
which is recommended for China today. Forth, back in early 1970s up to the late 1980s Japan was 
in the economic catch-up process like China is today.  
 
In this context we are interested in the question of if and how in Japan “fear of appreciation” 
affected the Bank of Japans’ interest rate decisions. A substantial number of previous studies 
(Clarida, Galí and Gertler 1998, Chinn and Dooley 1998, Hutchison 1988, Henning 1994, 
Funabashi 1988, McKinnon and Ohno 1997, Esaka 2000, Hillebrand and Schnabl 2006) have 
acknowledged that despite the official status of a freely floating economy the exchange rate has 
played an important role for Japanese monetary policy, in particular in times of appreciation. But to our knowledge no paper has formally analyzed the asymmetric impact of the exchange rate on 
Japanese interest rate decisions in appreciation phases and has explored the respective impact on the 
liquidity trap. 
  
We want to trace the possibly changing impact of the yen/dollar exchange rate on Japanese 
monetary policy based on a rolling Taylor type monetary policy reaction function with an exchange 
rate term. This allows us to provide a dynamic picture of the role of the exchange rate for Japanese 
monetary policy. To make an assessment of the impact of the yen appreciation on Japan’s liquidity 
trap we introduce an interaction term into the GMM framework.  
II.   MODEL SPECIFICATION 
 
To investigate the impact of the exchange rate on Japanese monetary policy in a freely floating 
environment we use the Taylor rule type forward-looking baseline specification by Clarida, Galí 
and Gertler (1998) and add an exchange rate term: 
 
[] () [] () ( ) * * * * 12 t t t t t t t t e e y y E E i i − + − Ω + − Ω + = + δ γ π π β   (1) 
 
In equation (1) it* is the central bank’s target nominal interest rate at the time t, which is assumed to 
depend on the long-term equilibrium interest rate i , expected inflation πt+12, expected current 
output y and (possibly) the current exchange rate et. Equation (1) underlies the assumption that the 
current output is not known at the time of the interest decision, but the exchange rate   is known 
with a minimum of information costs. We define the central bank targets other than the interest rate 
in gaps, i.e., as expected deviations from the (desired) bliss points for inflation (π
t e
t*), output (yt*), 
and the exchange rate (et*). E is the expectation operator and Ωt is the central bank’s information set 
at the time t. 
 
If, for instance, within a one year time horizon expected inflation  [ ] ( ) t t E Ω +12 π  is  rising  above 
(falling under) the target level π*, the central bank will raise (cut) the interest rate it*. Similarly, the 
interest rate will be reduced (increased), if current output is under (above) the desired level yt*.  
 
The exchange rate may influence interest rate decisions for several reasons. Exchange rate changes 
affect inflation expectations and output, as well as decision making in international policy 
coordination (as outlined by Funabashi 1988 and Henning 1994). If the exchange is appreciating 
below (depreciating above) the level et* (in price notation), which is regarded as appropriate by the 
 2   monetary authorities, interest rates will be reduced (increased). In this context the monetary 
authorities might be more concerned about appreciation than depreciation. 
 
Following Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1998), we assume interest rate smoothing as it is practised by 
the large (independently floating) economies (US, UK, Euro Area, Japan before March 1999) to 
smooth out shocks in the money market
1: 
() t t t t v i i i + + − = −1 * 1 ρ ρ   (2) 
 
In equation (2)   is the short-term nominal interest rate set by the central bank at the time t which 




ρ captures the degree of interest smoothing. The error term   is assumed to be normally 
distributed. Substituting equation (1) into (2), defining a constant 
t v
* βπ α − ≡ i , and eliminating the 
unobserved forecast variables yields the final specification for the estimation given by 
 
() () () ( ) ( ) ( ) t t t t t t t t i e e y y i ε ρ δ ρ γ ρ βπ ρ α ρ + + − − + − − + − + − = − + 1 12 * 1 * 1 1 1  (3) 
 
with  () [] () [ ] ( ) () t t t t t t t t t t v y y E y y E + Ω − − − + Ω − − − = + + * * 1 12 12 γ π π β ρ ε  
 
as a linear combination of the unobserved forecast variables and the error term .  t v
III.   ESTIMATIONS 
 
We estimate equation (3) based on a GMM framework. 
 
Data and Observation Period 
 
We use monthly data from the IMF International Financial Statistics. Japanese short-term interest 
rates are the uncollateralized money market call rates (mutanpô kôru rêto). Since monthly data are 
not available for the real GDP, we use seasonally adjusted industrial production as a proxy. The 
Hodrick-Prescott filter is used to calculate the output gap.
2 Inflation is measured as log differences 
of consumer price indices versus the previous years’ month.  
 
                                                 
1  China is already a large economy and can be expected to grow further. Therefore – in terms of size – it would qualify 
for a monetary policy as practiced in the US, UK, euro area and Japan (Goodfriend and Prasad 2007). Nevertheless, as 
long as financial markets remain underdeveloped, exchange rate stabilization is very likely to persist (McKinnon and 
Schnabl 2004).   
 3   
2 Different ways of estimating the output gap yield by and large the same results.   
 





























































































Source: IMF: IFS. 
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The yen/dollar gap is the deviation of the nominal yen/dollar exchange rate from a five-year (60 
months) backwards moving average. We justify the moving average as a reference value for the 
calculation of the exchange rate gap – rather than an arithmetic average – by the fact that since the 
early 1970s the yen appreciated considerably against the dollar (upper panel of Figure 1). Therefore 
the notion by which an exchange rate was considered as “high” changed over time. If the Chinese 
yuan would be allowed to float we would expect a similar situation because during the economic 
catch-up the Balassa-Samuleson effect would lead to a persistent nominal appreciation reflecting 
relative productivity gains (De Grauwe and Schnabl 2005).  
 
The Augmented Dickey-Fuller test rejects the null hypothesis for the output gap and the exchange 
rate gap at the 1%-level, and for inflation at the 10%-level. For the short-term interest rate the null 
cannot be rejected at the 10%-level. Following Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1998) we interpret this 
low acceptance as a result of the low power of the test. The observation period is from 1974:01, 
when the Japanese yen can be assumed to have become fully flexible up to 1999:03 when the 
Japanese short-term interest rate reached the zero bound and could therefore no longer be used as an 




The Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) provides a framework to cope with possible 
endogeneity bias between the interest rate and the independent variables (inflation, output and 
exchange rate). We use a “two-step” GMM with Newey-West standard errors. The lags of the 
regressors up to twelve previous periods and a constant are used as instruments.
3  
 
The estimation proceeds in three steps. First, we estimate global (static) coefficients for the entire 
observation period from 1974:01 to 1999:03 as well as for shorter observation periods as a 
robustness check. Second, we estimate ten-year rolling windows starting in 1974:01 and iterating 
forward month by month until 1999:03 in order to create a continuous picture on the role of the 
exchange rate for Japanese monetary policy in different time periods. Third, we introduce an 
interaction term which captures a possible asymmetric behaviour of the Bank of Japan monetary 
policy with respect to yen appreciation or depreciation (section IV). As an additional sensitivity test 
we perform the three steps also for the Federal Reserve which is widely argued to show “benign 
neglect” with respect to the exchange rate, in particular for the period after 1985. For instance, as 
 
3 We tested different sets of instruments by excluding/adding lags of the explanatory variables. The results remain 
widely unchanged.   6   
                                                
shown in the lower panel of Figure 1, there is no straightforward relationship between the exchange 




We estimate equation 3 for three alternative observation periods. (1) The whole observation period 
ranging from the end of the Bretton-Woods System until Japan’s fall into the liquidity trap in March 
1999
4, (2) the observation period of Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1998) from April 1979 to December 
1994 and (3) a period from April 1979 to March 1999 which excludes the period up to 1978 as by 
Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1998).
5
 
We are primarily interested in the question of how the exchange rate affected the Bank of Japan’s 
interest rate setting. Based on former studies such as those of McKinnon and Ohno (1997) and 
McKinnon and Schnabl (2004), we would expect a positive δ coefficient for two reasons. First, as 
appreciations affect the competitiveness of exports negatively, the Bank of Japan may have tended 
to lower interest rates to soften the yen appreciation and thereby to sustain growth. Second, as 
Japan’s very high international assets are mostly denominated in US dollars, yen appreciations 
against the dollar lower the worth of these assets in terms of domestic currency, for instance in the 
balance sheets of financial institutions. Interest rate cuts in times of appreciation enhance financial 
stability and are therefore in the interest of both the export and the financial sector.
   Both 
characteristics also apply to China. 
 
The results of the static estimations for the Bank of Japan are reported in Table 1. They are mainly 
in line with Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1998) revealing a significant impact of output, inflation and 
the exchange rate on Japanese monetary policy. In specific the δ coefficients have the expected 
signs and are highly significant for all observation periods providing robust evidence for a strong 
impact of the exchange rate on Japanese monetary policy. Interest rates were cut (increased) in 
appreciation (depreciation) phases. This is in line with previous research as listed in section I. For 
the whole observation period from 1974:01 up to 1999:03 the coefficient δ is positive and 
significant at the 5%-level. The size of the δ-coefficient suggests that an appreciation (depreciation) 
of the Japanese yen by 10 yen below (above) the target value led ceteris paribus to an interest rate 
cut (increase) by 0.83 percentage points.  
 
 
4 After March 1999 the interest rate remained at zero and could not be used anymore as a monetary policy instrument.  
5 Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1998: 1034) exclude the pre-1979 period because they argue that monetary policies were out 
of control during this period and therefore the estimations were unstable.  The result for the observation period of Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1998) from 1979:04 to 1994:12 is 
similar. The exchange rate term is significant at the 1%-level and the size of the coefficient is even 
larger suggesting that during this shorter period interest rates were cut (increased) by 1.2 percentage 
points in reaction to an appreciation (depreciation) by 10 yen per dollar below (above) the target 
value. For the observation period from April 1979 to March 1999 the impact of the exchange rate 
on the interest rate is even stronger (1.7 percentage points interest rate cut (increase) in response to 
an appreciation (depreciation) by 10 yen per dollar below (above) the target value). The coefficients 
which measure the impact of output and inflation on Japanese interest rate decisions have the 
expected positive signs and are highly significant for all observation periods.  
 
Table 1: GMM Estimations of Equation 3 for the Bank of Japan 
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   Coefficients       
Sample           
1974:01-1999:03  0.003806  1.308869***  0.758157**  0.000832**  0.976032*** 
   (0.009999)  (0.269450)  (0.312840)  (0.000416)  (0.008332) 
1979:04-1994:12  0.022443***  1.547003***  0.634762***  0.001226***  0.943432*** 
   (0.004846)  (0.215876)  (0.186282)  (000281)  (0.008838) 
1979:04-1999:03  0.002342  2.246797***  0.699022***  0.001659***  0.961037*** 
   (0.006782)  (0.007872)  (0.333956)  (0.15928)  (0.000319) 
Standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * denotes significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% - level. Test for 
over-identifying restrictions: J-Statistic for global estimates from 1974:01 to 1999:03: J = 
0.060190, χ
2(28), p-value = 0.92. J-Statistic for sub-period from 1979:04 to 1994:12: J = 0.103027, 
χ
2(28), p-value = 0.88.  J-Statistic for sub-period from 1979:04 to 1999:03: J = 0.100958, χ
2(28), p-
value = 0.66. 
α δ β γ ρ
 
 
In contrast, as shown in Table 2 for the Federal Reserve there is weak evidence that the exchange 
rate had a recognizable impact on US interest rate decisions. The result is similar to the Bank of 
Japan for the whole observation period, as the exchange rate term is negative
6 and turns out 
significant at the 5% level. Yet, the exchange rate term δ is significantly smaller than for Japan and 
is insignificant for the other two observation periods. The coefficients which show the impact of 
output and inflation on the Federal Reserves’ monetary policy have the expected signs and are 
highly significant.  
 
To this end, the static estimations suggest that – in contrast to the Federal Reserve – the Bank of 
Japan pursued with one instrument (interest rate) three targets (inflation, output, exchange rate). 
This may imply conflicts between the single targets such as between the exchange rate and 
inflation. For instance when interest rates are reduced (money supply expanded) to counteract 
appreciation, this may in the longer-term contradict the inflation target. Indeed, in the case the 
                                                 
6  A dollar appreciation (positive sign) implies a lower interest rate.  Japanese bubble economy the substantial interest rate cuts in 1986 and 1987 which intended to stop 
the “excessive” post-Plaza yen appreciation increased the liquidity supply to the Japanese economy 
which fuelled the speculation in the Japanese real estate and stock markets (Hoffmann and Schnabl 
2007).  
 
Table 2: GMM Estimations of Equation 3 for the Federal Reserve 
     Coefficients    
Sample       
1974:01-1999:03  0.017625 1.173998***  0.618517**  -0.00102**  0.958138*** 
γ γ ρ
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  (0.014452) (0.354942) (0.24071)  (0.000477) (0.009509) 
1979:04-1994:12  0.009898 1.581558***  0.681932***  -0.0002  0.943386*** 
  0.015525 (0.35457) (0.195969)  (0.000425)  (0.011862) 
1979:04-1999:03  0.010712 1.609592***  0.657147***  -0.0000953  0.936188*** 
   (0.01166) (0.305563)  (0.17887) (0.000355)  (0.013081) 
Standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * denotes significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% - level. Test for 
over-identifying restrictions: J-Statistic for global estimates from 1974:01 to 1999:03: J = 
0.093189, χ
2(28), p-value = 0.84. J-Statistic for sub-period from 1979:04 to 1994:12: J = 0.122518, 
χ2(28), p-value = 0.93. J-Statistic for sub-period from 1979:04 to 1999:03: J = 0.071316, χ2(28), p-
value = 0.95. 
 
 
Dynamic Results  
 
The static estimations don’t provide information about a possibly changing impact of the exchange 
rate on Japanese (or US) monetary policy decision making over the time dimension, in particular in 
times of appreciation. The impact of the exchange rate on Japanese monetary policy may have been 
weak during the 1970s, but may have become stronger during the 1980s and 1990s. Interest rates 
may have declined when the yen appreciated (falling exchange rate in price notation) but may have 
remained unchanged when the yen depreciated. This is suggested by the upper panel of Figure 1 
which shows the development of the yen/dollar exchange rate and the Japanese call money rate. 
Periods of strong appreciation such as 1977/78, 1986/87 and the first half of the 1990s are 
associated with substantial interest rate cuts. In contrast, in periods of yen depreciation such as 
during the first half of the 1980s and between 1996 and 1998, interest rates remained widely 
unchanged.  
  
To identify a changing impact of the yen/dollar exchange rate on monetary policy making, we 
pursue a dynamic approach to the monetary policy reaction function by rolling δ coefficients. If the 
Bank of Japan had operated under the same (stable) regime throughout the whole observation 
α β δ δ ρ α β 9   
                                                
period, we would expect similar coefficients and standard errors. Otherwise, the overlapping sub-
samples should reveal regime shifts.  
 
When estimating rolling δ coefficients for equation (3) we face a trade off with respect to the 
window size. The robustness of the results is increasing with the sample size due to the limited 
finite sample properties of the GMM. To detect potential changes in the monetary policy regime we 
prefer small sample sizes which can be assumed to be more sensible to possible regime shifts. 
Based on various tests we see a window size of 120 observations (10 years) as an adequate 
compromise. Other window sizes yield by and large the same results.   
 
The respective first sub-sample which is from 1964:01 up to 1974:01 extends to the Bretton Woods 
system. We are aware of the fact that during the first few years of the rolling estimations Japanese 
monetary policy decision making is not adequately specified, as a fixed exchange rate regime 
constitutes a different monetary framework than modelled in equation (3) with the exchange rate 
being the prominent monetary policy target.
7 This bias declines as the window is shifted month by 
month. 
 
Figure 2 shows the t-statistics for the exchange rate term (δ coefficient) for the Bank of Japan 
(upper panel) and the Federal Reserve (lower panel). We focus on the t-statistics of the exchange 
rate term as they indicate if the exchange rate had a significant impact on monetary policy decisions 
while at the same time controlling for the impact of output and inflation on interest rates. The 
rolling coefficients and t-statistics for output, inflation and the exchange rate are reported in the 
appendix in Figure 3 for the Bank of Japan and Figure 4 for the Federal Reserve. The solid 
horizontal grey lines indicate the significance levels of the δ coefficients at the 5% level.  
 
The upper panel of Figure 2 and the lower panels of Figure 3 show the t-statistics for the δ 
coefficient and the size of the δ coefficient estimated by the Bank of Japan monetary policy reaction 
function. For the Bank of Japan the δ coefficients are as expected mostly positive reflecting interest 
rate cuts (increases) in times of appreciation (depreciation). The importance of the yen/dollar 
exchange rate on Japanese monetary policy seems to have changed over time. Up to the late 1970s 
the significance level is comparatively low and therefore the evidence that the exchange rate had a 
significant impact on the Japanese monetary policy is weak. Yet, during the appreciation phase in 
the years 1977 into 1979 there is a sharp increase in the significance level, which is also in line with 
attempts of international policy coordination to stop the dollar depreciation (Henning 1994). 
 
7 Indeed the rolling results as shown in Figure 3 and Figure 4 show that the coefficients of inflation and output turn out 
insignificant and negative in the first ten years of the reporting period.   




















































Note: Dark lines are the t-statistics of the rolling coefficients. Solid grey lines indicate 5%-level of 
significance. Values are plotted for the last period of the estimated sub-sample. 
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From the early 1980s up to 1985, the yen remained weak against the dollar and Japanese monetary 
policy decisions do not seem to have been significantly affected by exchange rate changes. The 
September 1985 Plaza Agreement intended to appreciate the yen against the dollar by joint 
international (sterilized) foreign exchange intervention and the Japanese yen started to appreciate 
strongly (Funabashi 1988). In the first months after the Plaza Agreement there is only weak 
evidence for an significant impact of the exchange rate on Japan’s monetary policy, but after a 
certain time lag – as shown by Figure 2 and Figure 3 – both, the size and the significance level of 
the  δ coefficient increase sharply showing attempts of the Japanese central bank to counteract 
appreciation pressure by interest rate cuts. 
 
With the February 1986 Louvre Agreement, officially monetary (and fiscal) policy action was taken 
to prevent the yen from appreciating further (Funabashi 1988, Esaka 2000). Japanese interest rate 
cuts are reflected in further increasing significance levels of the δ coefficients. The value of the δ 
coefficient rises over the 1974-1999 average. The strong impact of the exchange rate on Japanese 
monetary policy continues throughout the second half of the 1980s and only declines after the burst 
of the bubble economy in late 1989.  
 
A declining value of the exchange rate coefficient (while still remaining highly significant) during 
the early 1990s indicates that the Bank of Japan gave less weight to the exchange rate. Nevertheless 
the impact of the exchange rate on the BOJ interest rate decisions remains significant during the 
1990s when the yen continued to appreciate and the ailing (domestic) Japanese economy became 
even more dependent on exports. A new highly significant spike in the δ-coefficient is observed in 
1995, when the Bank of Japan further lowered interest rates to stop the rise of the yen up to its 




While both, the size and the significance level of the δ coefficient decline after 1995 when the yen 
depreciated considerably against the dollar (Figure 1) a new spike is observed in 1998 until repeated 
attempts to prevent the yen from appreciating and stimulating the ailing Japanese economy by 
interest rate cuts brought Japan into the liquidity trap in March 1999. All in all, the upper panel of 
Figure 2 suggests that the impact of the yen/dollar exchange rate changed over time with respect to 
two dimensions. First, the impact seems to be much stronger in the post-Plaza period compared to 
the pre-Plaza period. Second, it seems that the impact of the exchange rate on interest rate decisions 
was stronger in appreciation than in depreciation phases.  
 
8 McKinnon and Ohno (1997) argue that the US put pressure on Japan in context of the negotiations about Japanese 
automobile exports to the US by bringing the dollar under depreciation pressure. The conflict was settled in February 
1995 when Japan agreed to voluntary export restraints and the US announced a strong dollar policy.    12   
 
In comparison to the Bank of Japan the response of the Federal Reserve to exchange rate swings is 
weak as shown by the lower panels of Figure 2 and Figure 4 in the appendix. The t-statistics as 
shown Figure 2 remain mostly within the band of the 5% significance level reflecting the widely 
acknowledged “benign neglect” of the Federal Reserve towards the exchange rate. The possible 
reaction pattern of the Federal Reserve towards exchange rate changes remains uncertain as – in 
contrast to the Bank of Japan – the t-values show both positive and negative signs. The upshot is 
that there is no evidence in favour of a systematic impact of the exchange rate on the Federal 
Reserves’ monetary policy decisions in particular since the mid 1980s. In contrast as shown in 
Figure 4 inflation and output turn out highly significant showing – as expected – the dominant role 
of inflation and output for the Federal Reserves’ monetary policy making.  
 
The – in contrast to the Federal Reserve – changing impact of the exchange rate for the Bank of 
Japans’ monetary policy decisions implies not only a conflict between the inflation and exchange 
rate target as argued above but rising uncertainty for private agents because the central bank tends 
to “switch” between the inflation and the exchange rate target. An example for this time 
inconsistency in monetary policy is the period around the bubble economy. After the Plaza 
Agreement, interest rates were reduced by more than 5 percentage points to counteract the yen 
appreciation in 1986 and 1987.  
 
After the increased money supply had contributed to excessive speculation in the Japanese stocks 
and real estate markets, the Bank of Japan increased the interest rate sharply (again by more than 5 
percentage points) in 1989 and 1990 to counteract the inflationary pressure of the bubble (Figure 1). 
When the yen started to appreciate after the burst of the bubble, interest rates were cut sharply again 
to counteract the continuing appreciation. The short-term interest rate gradually approached the zero 
bound.  
IV. ASYMMETRIC BEHAVIOUR AND LIQUIDITY TRAP 
 
The estimations as performed in section III suggest that the Bank of Japan responded actively to 
exchange rate changes. While the static estimations as reported in Table 1 provide evidence that the 
exchange rate in general has played an important role for Japanese monetary policy making, the 
rolling estimations show that the Bank of Japan was more sensible to exchange rate changes after 
the Plaza Agreement. Although the rolling t-statistics of the δ coefficient suggest higher 
significance levels in appreciation phases they do not provide systematic evidence for an 
asymmetric reaction of Japanese interest rates in response to yen appreciation. In principle a positive δ coefficient indicates both interest cuts in times of appreciation and interest rate hikes in 
times of depreciation.  
 
Possible asymmetric monetary policy behaviour with respect to exchange rate changes in 
appreciation and depreciation phases may provide an explanation why Japan fell into the liquidity 
trap in early 1999 as suggested by McKinnon and Ohno (1997). Given that appreciation and 
depreciation phases are equally distributed over the observation period, interest rates would tend to 
move ceteris paribus towards zero if interest rates are reduced when the exchange rate appreciates 
but remain widely unchanged when the exchange rate depreciates. If – as in the case of Japan and in 
general in the case of countries in the economic catch-up process such as China (McKinnon and 
Schnabl 2006, De Grauwe and Schnabl 2005) – appreciation phases are more frequent than 
depreciation phases, this effect would be enforced.  
 
We introduce an asymmetric interaction term as proposed for instance by Zakoian (1994) for 
GARCH frameworks into equation 3 to isolate the Bank of Japan monetary policy response in 
appreciation phases. This interaction term I takes the value 1 for appreciation periods (e*>et) and 
the value 0 for depreciation periods (e*<et). To identify an asymmetric behaviour in interest rate 
decisions with respect to appreciation phases the interaction term is multiplied with the exchange 
rate gap. This yields the following specification: 
 
() () () ( ) ( ) ( ) t t t t t t t t t i e e I y y i ε ρ η ϕ ρ γ ρ βπ ρ α ρ + + − + − + − − + − + − = − + 1 12 * ) ( 1 * 1 1 1  (4) 
 
In equation 4 the coefficient η captures the interest rate responses in appreciation phases. If η is 
significant (and positive) the Bank of Japan reacted significantly different in appreciation phases 
compared to depreciation phases (with interest rate cuts). The size of the η coefficient (economic 
effect) indicates the interest rate effect which is additionally triggered by the appreciation. The total 
economic effect in appreciation phases is captured by the sum of the coefficients η and φ. The Wald 
test for joint significance of η and φ indicates of this total effect is significant.  
 
The results for the Bank of Japan are reported in Table 3 for three different observations periods 
and provide evidence for an asymmetric reaction of Japanese monetary policy to exchange rate 
changes only in appreciation phases. For the whole observation period from January 1974 to March 
1999 the η coefficient is significant at the ten percent level. In appreciation phases the Bank of 
Japan responded ceteris paribus to an appreciation of 10 yen per dollar below the target value with a 
10 percentage points interest rates cut in appreciation phases. The φ and η coefficients are jointly 
significant at the 10 percent level as indicated by the Wald test.  
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Table 3: GMM Estimations of Equation 4 Accounting for Appreciation Phases with 
Interaction Terms for the Bank of Japan 
     Coefficients       
Sample     Φ  η   
1974:01-  0.111467  1.649323*** 1.104812* -0.007854*  0.017889* 0.97411*** 
ρ α α β β γ γ
1999:03  (0.057709) (0.561440) (0.723082) (0.004984) (0.011229) (0.015613) 
      χ2(1)  p-value 
   Wald-Test of Joint Significance of  η and φ: 3.26174*  0.07 
1979:04-  0.039938*** 1.48243*** 0.540838*** 0.000134  0.002725** 0.936912***
1994:12  (0.008765) (0.230780) (0.164379) (0.000444) (0.001129) (0.009302) 
      χ2(1)  p-value 
   Wald-Test of Joint Significance of  η and φ:   39.7990***  0.0000 
1979:04- 0.026613**  2.374956*** 0.693892*** -0.000162  0.004811*** 0.961944***
1999:03 (0.011616)  (0.38123)  (0.177357) (0.00062)  (0.001651) (0.007694) 
      χ2(1)  p-value 
   Wald-Test of Joint Significance of  η and φ:   22.1963***  0.0000 
Standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * denotes significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% - level. Test for 
over-identifying restrictions: J-Statistic for global estimates from 1974:01 to 1999:03. J = 
0.049310, χ
2(27), p-value = 0.97. J-Statistic for sub-period from 1979:12 to 1994:12. J = 0.101262 , 
χ2(27), p-value = 0.86.  J-Statistic for sub-period from 1979:12 to 1994:12: J = 0.101262 , χ2(27), 
p-value = 0.86. J-Statistic for sub-period from 1979:12 to 1999:03: J = 0.090935 , χ2(27), p-value = 
0.74. η represents the coefficient of the interaction term of the yen/dollar gap and the appreciation 
dummy. The dummy variable is 1 in appreciation phases and 0 for depreciation phases. 
 
The evidence for an asymmetric impact of the exchange rate on Japanese interest rates in 
appreciation phases is getting stronger for the observation periods which start in 1979. Remember 
that the significance levels of the rolling δ coefficients increased after 1985. For the observation 
period from April 1979 to December 1994 the η coefficient is as expected positive and turns out 
highly significant indicating an asymmetric response of the Japanese monetary policy to exchange 
rate changes in appreciation phases. Now the economic effect is smaller, as φ plus η indicate an 
interest rate cut by 2.8 percentage points in response to an appreciation of 10 yen per dollar below 
the target value. The Wald test indicates that the total economic effect in appreciation phases is 
highly significant at the one percent level.  
 
Also for the observation period from April 1979 to March 1999 there is strong evidence that 
Japanese monetary policy reacted strongly to the appreciation pressure on the Japanese yen. The η 
is highly significant, but the economic effect is smaller, as the Bank of Japan seems to have cut 
interest rates by 0.46 percentage points in reaction to an appreciation of 10 yen per dollar below the 
target value. Again η and φ are together highly significant. This implies strong evidence in favour 
of an asymmetric response of the Bank of Japan in appreciation phases. In short, the continuous 
appreciation pressure on the Japanese yen and Japan’s “fear of appreciation” gradually pushed the 
country into the liquidity trap.  
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Equation 4 is also estimated for the Federal Reserve. The results are reported in Table 4. In the case 
of the Federal Reserve for all three observation periods, an asymmetric interest rate effect 
originating in appreciation phases can not be isolated. The η coefficient remains for all three 
observation periods insignificant. To this end the GMM estimation of equation 4 which accounts for 
possible asymmetric behaviour in appreciation phases with an interaction term, clearly confirms the 
Federal Reserves’ benign neglect towards the exchange rate.  
 
Table 4: GMM Estimations of Equation 4 Accounting for Appreciation Phases with 
Interaction Terms for the Federal Reserve 
     Coefficients       
Sample     φ  η   
1974:01-  0.012429  1.131625** 0.604064** -0.001686  0.001139  0.95782*** 
ρ
 15   
1999:03  (0.022727) (0.569118) (0.257906) (0.002333) (0.003944) (0.0107) 
      χ2(1)  p-value 
   Wald-Test of Joint Significance of  η and φ: 3.8547*  0.05813 
1979:04-  0.005368 1.581152*** 0.647058*** -0.000743  0.000792 0.94236*** 
1994:12  (0.019705) (0.424957) (0.221897) (0.002007) (0.003339) (0.016493) 
      χ2(1)  p-value 
   Wald-Test of Joint Significance of  η and φ:   0.75330  0.38540 
1979:04- 0.008144  1.593686*** 0.664951*** -0.0004  0.00059  0.935083***
1999:03  (0.014829) (0.345569) (0.183452) (0.00164)  (0.002743) (0.016553) 
      χ2(1)  p-value 
   Wald-Test of Joint Significance of  η and φ:   0.1365  0.7118 
 
All in all, the interaction term provides strong evidence that (starting from the late 1970s) the Bank 
Japan responded asymmetrically to exchange rate swings in appreciation phases. This implies that 
the Bank of Japans monetary policy contributed to Japans fall into the liquidity trap for two reasons. 
First, interest rates were reduced in times of appreciation, but remained widely unchanged in times 
of depreciation. Second, during the economic catch-up of the Japanese economy which can be 
assumed to have lasted up to the late 1980s, appreciation phases were more frequent than 
depreciation phases due to relative productivity gains with respect to the US. 
 
This finding is line with McKinnon and Schnabl (2006) who argue that the flexible exchange rate of 
the yen against the dollar has contributed to a negative risk premium on the Japanese interest rate 
which – given the US interest rates and sustained appreciation expectations for the Japanese yen – 
pushed Japan into the liquidity trap.  
 
α β γ α β γ γ ρ α α β β γ 16   
V.   ECONOMIC POLICY IMPLICATION  
 
China faces today a similar decision like Japan faced in the early 1970s, i.e. a possible shift from a 
fixed to flexible exchange rate regime during the economic catch-up. The decision in July 2005 to 
release the hard peg to the dollar and to allow for a gradual but controlled appreciation of the 
Chinese yuan against the dollar can be seen as a first step into this direction. We studied for Japan 
the static and dynamic information content of Taylor-type monetary policy reaction functions with 
respect to the exchange rate. The Bank of Japan provides a suitable case study for China, as in both 
countries growth has been strongly dependent on exports. In addition both countries have large 
dollar denominated international assets. Both factors make the two countries one-sided sensible to 
appreciations of the domestic currency. 
  
The static GMM estimations suggest that the Bank of Japan – although officially labelled a freely 
floating economy – pursued three targets of monetary policy making (inflation, output, exchange 
rate). This implies potential conflicts between single targets such as between the exchange rate and 
inflation as well as higher uncertainty with respect to monetary policy making – for instance as 
experienced during the Japanese bubble economy. Rolling GMM estimations provide evidence that 
the role of the exchange rate for the Bank of Japan’s interest rate decisions has increased in times of 
strong appreciation pressure and was stronger after 1985 than before 1985. This confirms rising 
uncertainty with respect to monetary policy making as the central bank tended to “switch” between 
the exchange rate and the inflation target. Finally, an interaction term provides evidence in favour 
of a one sided sensibility of the Bank of Japan with respect to appreciation pressure. This suggests 
that repeated interest rate cuts have contributed to Japans liquidity trap. 
 
To this end, our exercise provides the following lessons for China. First, even in the absence of 
(systematic) foreign exchange intervention the exchange rate might strongly influence monetary 
policy decision making under freely floating exchange rates which increases uncertainly, volatility 
and the probability of crisis. This effect will be particularly strong if the respective economy is 
sensible to the competitiveness of exports and if international assets are denominated in foreign 
currency.  
 
As both seem to be the case for Japan and China, China might react similarly to (productivity 
driven) appreciation pressure once the exchange is floated. This would also imply a higher 
probability to fall into the liquidity trap. The economic policy implication is to maintain the fixed 
exchange rate regime as long as the economic catch-up of China continues and China remains 
sensible to exchange rate fluctuations, in specific in times of appreciation. While the dollar might be  17   
considered as the natural anchor currency for China, alternative anchors may be considered, if 
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